



## Polish-Japanese Intelligence Cooperation-Causes, Methods and Effects

Dr. Rafał P Depczyński<sup>1\*</sup>, Dr. Oleg Miętki<sup>2</sup>, Mgr Pius Kacprzak<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1-3</sup> Pomeranian University, Starogard Gdański, Poland

\* Corresponding Author: Dr. Rafał P Depczyński

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### Abstract

This study examines the origins, evolution, and strategic significance of Józef Piłsudski's initiative to establish political, military, and intelligence cooperation between the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and Japan during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Following his imprisonment and exile, Piłsudski emerged as the principal architect of an insurrectionary and independence-oriented strategy within the PPS, contrasting sharply with both internationalist socialist currents and the passive-nationalist stance of Roman Dmowski's National League. The article traces the reorganization of the PPS after 1901, highlighting the consolidation of underground structures, expansion of party membership, and the absence of a centralized armed formation capable of undertaking large-scale combat or sabotage operations.

The outbreak of war between Russia and Japan created a unique geopolitical opportunity for Piłsudski to operationalize his long-held vision of armed struggle through cooperation with a foreign power hostile to Russia. The study analyzes diplomatic and clandestine contacts initiated by PPS representatives with Japanese authorities in Vienna, London, and ultimately Tokyo, emphasizing the cautious but growing Japanese interest in Polish intelligence, sabotage, and diversionary activities, particularly against the Trans-Siberian Railway. It also explores the limitations of this cooperation, including Japan's reluctance to officially sponsor Polish armed formations or recognize the Polish cause internationally.

By situating Polish-Japanese collaboration within the broader context of competing Polish political strategies and international law constraints, the article demonstrates that Piłsudski's initiatives, though modest in immediate results, laid the organizational and ideological foundations for later Polish paramilitary structures and reinforced the concept of independence achieved through armed struggle and strategic alliances.

**Keywords:** Intelligence, Russo-Japanese War, Military Support, Military-Intelligence Cooperation

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### Introduction

In November 1901, after spending over 21 months in prison in St. Petersburg (due to his arrest by the tsarist authorities), Józef Piłsudski once again joined the active organizational and independence activities of the Polish Socialist Party. After escaping from prison, he left for the Austrian Partition. The four-month stay of the Piłsudski spouses in the Galician land, which provided them with shelter from Russian persecution, allowed Piłsudski to see that the Austrian Partition, in comparison to the Russian Partition, was a land of individual political freedoms and almost full equality of civil life for Polish subjects of the Viennese Habsburg court.

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Józef Piłsudski saw the benefits for the development of independence thought resulting from the political freedom of the Polish Galician atmosphere. Leaving Galicia for London, in order to find out about the existing situation of the PPS in the Russian partition, he came up with the idea of creating a "PPS party brain". It was to be located outside the borders of the Russian partition, so that it would not have to deal with the daily demands of conspiracy in its territory, and at the same time, so that it would not be too far from its area, which was the main area of independence activities of the PPS. Therefore, the most advantageous place for its location, according to Piłsudski, was "Austrian Galicia".

In London, Piłsudski also had the opportunity to state that the new PPS leadership, which had been formed after his arrest, at the 5th PPS Congress (in September 1900 in Skierniewice), in the persons of Aleksander Sulkiewicz, Stanisław Wojciechowski and Feliks Sachs, tried to continue working for the good of the Polish cause. It managed to maintain the publishing rhythm of "Robotnik", whose new editorial office headed by Feliks Perl and printing house were opened in Kiev. It also maintained the functionality of the PPS border transfer point in Wierzbołów, serviced after S. Sulkiewicz by the young Józef Nowicki. In addition, it tied the party organizational contacts severed by the arrests and created new ones.

As part of these new organizational and party contacts, the PPS leadership managed to organize two clandestine, PPS transfer border points<sup>[1]</sup> and create an organizational and party division of Warsaw into six District Workers' Committees: Praga, Powiśle, Wola, Jerozolimskie Rogatki, Powązki and a sixth one associating all craftsmen - members of the PPS. Together, these committees formed the Warsaw Workers' Committee WKR<sup>[2]</sup>.

The first mentioned contact point operated in the forests of the Zamojski estate, which stretched all the way to the Austrian border. It was operated by their administrator Jan Mikłaszewski, who, among other things, smuggled the Piłsudski spouses from Kiev to Galicia via this route. The second contact point operated in St. Petersburg. It was at the disposal of the St. Petersburg PPS group, led by Władysław Antoni Dehnel. These were unquestionable successes that could be achieved in the conditions of agent-police surveillance by the Russian special services of the tsarist authorities, exercising administrative authority over the entire Polish-Lithuanian lands of the Russian partition.

Józef Piłsudski, however, had plans to organize a larger undertaking. He intended to expand the structures of the PPS, arm them and, taking advantage of the first possible opportunity, to engage them in combat against Russia. Soon, events in the Far East brought his idea closer to reality. However, for it to become real, he had to undertake covert cooperation with a distant ally.

### Political situation

At the beginning of 1902 Józef Piłsudski was concerned about the growing social phenomena that were unfavourable to the PPS. Firstly, a slight increase in the number of PPS members, accompanied by a simultaneous increase in the

activity of groups opposed to the insurrectionary and independence ideological assumptions of the PPS. Especially the internationalist Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland, led by Rosa Luxemburg and Julian Marchlewski, and the conciliatory-nationalist National League, led from 1896 by a 5-person Central Committee composed of:<sup>[3]</sup> Roman Dmowski (1864-1939), Zygmunt Balicki (1858-1916), Jan Ludwik Popławski (1854-1908), Karol Raczkowski (1869-1959) and Teofil Waligórski (1859-1913). Secondly, the growing activation of separatist-nationalist political movements of other nations enslaved by the Russian tsarism, which was a particularly undesirable phenomenon for the PPS's activities in Lithuania and the Ukrainian partition of Russia, where the influences of Russian revolutionary movements intersected with the influences of Polish socialists under the banner of the PPS and Polish nationalists under the banner of the National League, as well as Polish compromisers representing the eastern Galician landed gentry, opposed to all the independence assumptions of the PPS.

In this situation, Józef Piłsudski decided to return to the territory of the Russian partition and personally lead the revival of the organizational and personnel activities of the PPS. At the end of April 1902, he returned to Vilnius, where, energetically taking up organizational and party work, he led to the organization of the 6th Congress of the PPS in Lublin in June 1902. He also reorganized the previous local structure of the PPS, dividing all the areas of programmatic interest of the party in the Russian Empire into PPS party districts, while the internal organization of the CKR introduced the relevant work departments. According to Piłsudski's assumptions, the team of the new CKR PPS was to be significantly expanded, as it was to include the heads of party districts, the editor of "Robotnik" and a representative of the London board of the ZZSP.

This extensive CKR, however, met with opposition from some national activists who believed that in the conditions of necessary clandestine activity of the party, such an extensive central body would not be capable of operational action. This position was expressed mainly by Feliks Sachs and Adam Buyno. Therefore, a compromise solution was adopted, consisting in that the 11-person CKR elected according to the above assumptions selected a 3-person Executive Commission of the CKR PPS, being a kind of presidium, in which the leading role of Józef Piłsudski was already clearly visible. The already existing legend of Piłsudski as an uncompromising advocate of the idea of insurrection and independence and his actual operational organizational and personnel activities had an influence on this state of affairs. Despite certain controversies within the PPS leadership and ranks regarding the forms of struggle for regaining national and state independence, Piłsudski's emerging popularity led to an increase in the ranks of the PPS, which at the turn of 1903/1904 had about 1,000 organized members and was the most active political organisation in the Polish community of the Russian partition<sup>[4]</sup>.

According to Piłsudski's assessment at the time, a major inconvenience was the fact that these organized PPS

<sup>1</sup> W. Pobóg-Malinowski, *The Contemporary Political History of Poland 1864-1945*, vol. 1 (1864-1919), Paris 1953, Craiova Publishing Agency, Warsaw 1990, p. 109.

<sup>2</sup> A. Garlicki, *Józef Piłsudski 1867-1935. Biography*, Wydawnictwo "Czytelnik", Warsaw 1988, p. 75.

<sup>3</sup> W. Pobóg-Malinowski, *The Latest*, op. cit., p. 82.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 120.

propagators of the idea of an insurrectionary and independence struggle were scattered in small groups throughout the entire area of the Polish-Lithuanian lands of the Russian partition<sup>[5]</sup>. The most dynamic center of PPS activity was the Warsaw center, where the number of organized members was about 500 people, while the remaining 500 operated more or less actively in the remaining areas of the Russian partition and the main capital-provincial cities of the Russian Empire<sup>[6]</sup>. However, there was no central center or organizationally formed group that could be used for specific "technical activities" if necessary, or pushed to perform a larger combat-party task. Although the PPS proclaimed the idea of an armed national liberation uprising of the communities in the Russian partition, until the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in February 1904 it had neither an armed party reconnaissance-defensive nor an operational-terrorist formation.

It is true that the PPS leadership, and especially Józef Piłsudski and his closest circle, did not hide their insurrectionary and independence intentions and the propaganda and mental preparations made in this regard, which was met with condemnation and sharp criticism from internationalist and democratic-nationalist groups, and above all with fierce persecution and ruthless prosecution and police-criminal-judicial combating of the occupiers' tsarist authorities. The National Democrat "Przegląd Wszepolski",<sup>[7]</sup> a propaganda mouthpiece of Roman Dmowski's National League, which at that time had about 350 members, stigmatized the PPS activists particularly sharply, calling the PPS leaders "socialist halfwits" who wanted to play insurrectionary wars against the "indomitable might of Russia"<sup>[8]</sup>.

### Polish-Japanese cooperation

The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in early February 1904 created conditions for the practical verification of the strategic and tactical assumptions of the PPS formulated by Piłsudski. They assumed basing the national liberation struggle of the Polish-Lithuanian lands of the Russian partition on military and intelligence cooperation with one of the European or Asian powers hostile to Russia at that time and therefore interested in possible anti-Russian military and intelligence cooperation with the PPS. The party, in turn, offered assistance in the form of:

- obtaining and transmitting intelligence information from the territory of the Russian Empire for the side of an allied power by members of the reconnaissance and intelligence service of the Polish side operating in the territory of that empire;
- carrying out acts of sabotage and diversion on communication lines and facilities important for the economy and mobilization-military efficiency of the Russian Empire;
- inciting and organizing mass desertions to the enemy side of soldiers of the tsarist army of Polish origin, which weakened the strength and morale of the tsarist operational and tactical associations in units in which

many soldiers of Polish and Lithuanian nationality served (often under duress);

- instigating sabotage activities behind the tsarist troops in the form of insurgent guerrilla activities of Polish national liberation units armed and equipped by the side of an allied power interested in this type of anti-Russian cooperation;
- the organization of Polish auxiliary military units alongside the troops of the allied power, which after the defeat of the tsarist-Russian side would become a component of the army of the reborn Polish state.

Piłsudski, who had been observing with great interest the symptoms of the approaching armed conflict between Russia and Japan, at the end of January 1904, cooperating in this respect with Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz, who knew English well, and Bolesław Jędrzejowski, decided to offer in a confidential manner to the Japanese ambassador in Vienna, Viscount Nabuoki Makino, the possible participation of the PPS in the fight against Tsarist Russia. In connection with the above, Jodko-Narkiewicz – after agreeing on the content with Piłsudski and Jędrzejowski – on February 8, 1904 sent the first letter to the Japanese ambassador in Vienna<sup>[9]</sup>. Thus, for the first time in Piłsudski's practical activity – as one of the leading leaders of the still poor PPS – an offer of intelligence services appeared, in line with the programmatic assumptions of that party, as a form of compensation for the material support for the anti-tsarist, Polish national liberation activities of the community in the lands of the Russian partition.

The Japanese ambassador to Vienna did not reply to Jodko-Narkiewicz's letter, because he was probably indifferent to the issue of Polish national and state liberation, and he probably did not believe in greater possibilities of conducting intelligence activities for Japan by Poles enslaved by Russia. Therefore, Jodko-Narkiewicz sent the Japanese ambassador a second letter. The Japanese ambassador to Vienna also left this letter unanswered. At that time, Piłsudski, in agreement with London activists of the PPS: Tytus Filipowicz (1873-1953), Aleksander Malinowski (1869-1922) and Stanisław Wojciechowski (1869-1953), decided to establish contact with the Japanese authorities through the Japanese ambassador in London, Count Hayashi Tadasu (1850-1913), to whom Jodko-Narkiewicz sent an extensive letter – a memorandum on 15 March 1904, in which he presented the assumptions of the anti-tsarist program of the PPS national liberation struggle and at the same time provided information on the anti-tsarist activities of other revolutionary groups operating in the Russian Empire<sup>[10]</sup>.

In contrast to the Japanese ambassador in Vienna, Count Tadasu, as a former Japanese ambassador to Russia in the years 1897-1900, showed great interest in Jodko-Narkiewicz's letter and had a confidential meeting with him on 16 March 1904. Following this meeting, on the same day, Tadasu sent an encrypted telegram to Tokyo to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Komura Jutarō (1855-1911)<sup>[11]</sup>. The Minister of Foreign Affairs showed great

<sup>5</sup> Ibidem, p. 120.

<sup>6</sup> Ibidem, p. 120.

<sup>7</sup> J. Łojek (ed.), *The Polish press in the years 1661-1864*, PWN Publishing House, Warsaw 1976, p. 56.

<sup>8</sup> W. Pobóg-Malinowski, *The Latest*, op. cit., p. 121.

<sup>9</sup> E. Pałasz-Rutkowska, *AT Romer, History of Polish-Japanese relations 1904-1945*, BELLONA Publishing House, Warsaw 1996, p. 33.

<sup>10</sup> Ibidem, p. 34.

<sup>11</sup> Ibidem, p. 34.

interest in the proposals received from the PPS and on 20 March 1904, he gave Count Tadasu a reply to his encrypted message<sup>[12]</sup>.

As it appeared from the content of the cryptograms, the Japanese side was most interested in the proposal of the possibility of conducting sabotage by the PPS on the Trans-Siberian Railway,<sup>[13]</sup> which, built since 1891, was the only fast rail supply route for Russian troops in Manchuria. Of course, in March 1904, such a proposal from the PPS was much beyond the actual possibilities of its implementation, because at that time the party did not have the necessary forces or means to implement it. It required, first of all, appropriate financial outlays, which the leadership hoped to receive from the Japanese government, if it considered it expedient and beneficial for it to undertake sabotage activities on this communication route by PPS rail-road sabotage groups.

One of the difficulties in this matter was the fact that the Japanese side had to officially respect international law, which at the outbreak of the war declared that: " *the war zone is limited to the territory of China occupied by Russia and the maritime area between them and Japan* " <sup>[14]</sup>. Hence, the Japanese authorities could not officially act as an "ally sponsor of Polish sabotage activities on the Trans-Siberian Railway", because it ran outside the "war zone" declared by Japan. At that time, the warring parties were still trying to maintain the appearance of respecting their own official declarations and the principles of existing international law. This did not mean avoiding covert actions and the lack of interest of the Japanese authorities in this type of "Polish activity" and its secret sponsorship by them.

Envoy Tadasu, who was personally convinced of the benefits for the Japanese side from such anti-tsarist activities of PPS sabotage groups, interested the Japanese military attaché in London, Colonel Utsunomiya Toro (1861-1922), in the matter of military-intelligence-sabotage cooperation, because such activities and cooperation were mainly the domain of military factors. From then on, they were joint advocates of establishing closer cooperation with the PPS. Of course, the Japanese were very interested in Polish anti-Russian sabotage activities in the rear of Russian troops in Manchuria and on the Trans-Siberian Railway, but they were not in too much of a hurry to provide advance financial assistance before the Polish side showed that it was able not only to present promising proposals in writing, but also to actually act within the proposed scope of cooperation.

The lack of financial resources prevented the PPS leadership from undertaking even modest (somewhat demonstrative) anti-Russian sabotage activities, and until the Japanese were convinced of the possibility of conducting such activities, they were not willing to provide the PPS leadership with appropriate financial support, limiting themselves only to providing the PPS representatives with modest sums for their stay in London and covering the costs of Piłsudski and Filipowicz's ship travel to Tokyo and back for direct talks with Japanese government decision-makers. The PPS leadership, wanting to show the Japanese that it had some possibilities of influencing the society of the Russian partition, informed them through Jodka-Narkiewicz

(Japanese ambassador in London) about the organization by the PPS of a large anti-Russian anti-war demonstration in Warsaw on March 14, 1904, which sided with Japan.

On March 20, 1904, Jodka-Narkiewicz held another secret meeting with MP Hayashi, at which the subject of the conversation was the memorandum of the PPS leadership regarding the possible formation of a Polish legion in Japan. During the conversation, MP Hayashi informed Jodka-Narkiewicz that this matter could not be the subject of cooperation talks, because "the Japanese government cannot conscript foreigners into its army." The PPS leadership felt disappointed in its hopes of creating a Polish legion alongside the Japanese army, because it assumed that, following the example of the Italian Legions of General H. Dąbrowski - thanks to Japanese aid - it would be able to create cadres for the future Polish insurgent armed force.

The refusal to create a Polish legion somewhat discouraged the PPS leadership from cooperating with the Japanese, but rationality in assessing the existing situation dictated that closer cooperation with them be maintained and maintained in all other areas in which they were or would be interested in maintaining cooperation. At that time, Japan was the only world power hostile to Tsarist Russia, which could provide the Polish side with real financial and material-military assistance in creating armed PPS units. The creation of these units was essential for the credibility of the PPS ideological assumptions and the future implementation of the assumed regaining of Polish independence and national-state sovereignty through an armed national-liberation uprising, called at the right time, for which it was necessary to prepare forces and means of a military nature in advance.

That is why in Jodka-Narkiewicz's conversation with the Japanese ambassador in London (March 20, 1904) he probably stated that regardless of the establishment of the Polish Legion, PPS fighters would conduct anti-Russian sabotage and diversion activities. This can be confirmed by the cryptogram from ambassador Hayashi to minister Komuro, who informs him that: " *The Poles are determined to blow up the bridges regardless of whether they receive help from Japan or not. But if they receive financial help, they will be able to increase the number of men. I told him that first, before we provide such help, we must see some effects of this type of action* . " <sup>[15]</sup>

The presentation of the "effects of this type of action" was very difficult for the PPS side at that time to implement, because the PPS leadership did not yet have any forces or resources to carry out any spectacular, anti-Russian sabotage and diversion action on a larger scale. The PPS leadership, and especially J. Piłsudski, intended to establish armed units, but in March 1904 they did not have them yet. Therefore, Jodka-Narkiewicz in his next letter addressed to MP Hayashi (March 27, 1904) informed MP Hayashi about the exact numbers of conscripts and reservists from individual military districts of Russia who were drafted into the Russian army before and after the outbreak of the war<sup>[16]</sup>.

In order to confirm the possibility of obtaining information by the PPS about the movements of Russian troops, Jodka-Narkiewicz wrote in the further part of his letter. At the same time, he attached to it the content of an appeal addressed to

<sup>12</sup> Ibidem, p. 35.

<sup>13</sup> Ibidem, p. 35.

<sup>14</sup> Ibidem, p. 35.

<sup>15</sup> E. Pałasz-Rutkowska, AT Romer, History of relations ... op. cit., 36.

<sup>16</sup> Ibidem, p. 36.

soldiers of the Russian army of Polish nationality serving in Manchuria, which the PPS side would like to distribute among them, calling for desertion to the side of the Japanese troops, if the Japanese government agrees to it<sup>[17]</sup>. In connection with the above, MP Hayashi sent another urgent cryptogram to his departmental minister<sup>[18]</sup>. The Japanese government authorities - the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff - were in no hurry to respond, so on April 16, Jodko-Narkiewicz sent another letter to MP Hayashi<sup>[19]</sup>. The content of the letter showed that the Polish side, being the petitioner, not only submitted its proposals with a request for their consideration by the Japanese side, but also expressed hope that the parties would be guided by the principle of mutual benefits resulting from the established cooperation. In his intentions, Piłsudski even put forward far-reaching hopes that Japan could commit to presenting the Polish issue at a post-war international conference. The content of the above pierces the boot of the victorious creator of the Polish state established in 1918, who in 1904 "did not decide on anything immediately", because the conditions were dictated by the Japanese side, and only it at that time offered the PPS and Piłsudski as one of its leaders modest financial and military aid. On the other hand, the war waged by Russia with Japan did not have a major impact on improving the fate of Poles in the Russian partition, apart from claiming the lives of many Poles serving in the Russian army fighting in Manchuria.

It was therefore necessary to decide on everything that the Japanese side offered the PPS for its intelligence services. These services first had to be organized for money possibly received from the Japanese government, and such possibilities began to take real shape in May 1904. This happened thanks to the Japanese military attaché in London – Colonel Utsunomiya, who, following his line, interested the General Staff of the Japanese Army in intelligence-sabotage-diversion cooperation with the PPS. The latter considered it advisable to invite representatives of the PPS to Tokyo for direct talks on cooperation. Colonel Utsunomiya passed on such an invitation to the Polish side, which delegated Piłsudski, the most competent person in military-intelligence matters in the PPS leadership, and T. Filipowicz, who spoke English fluently, to travel to Japan for talks. The PPS leadership decided that direct talks in Tokyo could yield more than the exchange of correspondence by the Polish side and the slowness of the Japanese responses to this correspondence. The costs of the return journey and the stay in Tokyo of the two PPS representatives were covered by the General Staff of the Japanese army. Piłsudski was informed of the invitation to Tokyo from London on May 7, 1904, and in connection with this he met in Vienna on May 21-23 with Colonel Utsunomiya, who had come to Vienna from London especially for this purpose. The talks with Utsunomiya did not make Piłsudski too optimistic about the whole undertaking.

### Politics and military cooperation

The Warsaw Workers' Committee of the PPS, and following

in its footsteps the other local Workers' Committees, intensified the anti-tsarist mass agitation, holding numerous street demonstrations against the war, mobilization, high prices and unemployment, and its central leadership decided to establish its own armed units and to establish anti-Russian military-intelligence-sabotage cooperation with the Japanese side, counting on the fact that the government of fighting Japan would support its efforts to create PPS armed units capable of conducting sabotage-sabotage actions and intelligence-information activities for Japan.

At the same time, Dmowski's National League was opposed to any anti-tsarist armed action propagated by the PPS, proclaiming slogans of passivity and waiting for the final outcome of the Russo-Japanese war<sup>[20]</sup>. In this way, on the one hand, it tried to dissuade Poles from undertaking open attempts at armed insurrectionary resistance against tsarism, and on the other – it suggested to Polish soldiers of the Russian army that they desert from this army, although it did not say so explicitly, allowing each of them to understand the statements of the proclamation for their own purposes. Therefore, Piłsudski was not very surprised by Dmowski's meeting in Tokyo, when on July 11, 1904, together with Filipowicz, they found themselves in the capital of Japan. However, before this happened, Piłsudski found himself again in London on June 2, to clarify with the representatives of Japan all matters concerning his trip to Tokyo, as a representative of the PPS for direct talks with competent members of the Japanese government, concerning the establishment of Polish-Japanese, anti-Russian military and intelligence cooperation.

Piłsudski's renewed conversation with the London Japanese diplomats – envoy Hayashi and military attaché Utsunomiya – made a much better impression than the first one in Vienna and filled them with hope<sup>[21]</sup>. At the same time, Piłsudski and Filipowicz received letters of recommendation from envoy Hayashi to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the General Staff from Colonel Utsunomiya, who recommended establishing contact in particular with General Fukushima Yasumasa (1852-1919),<sup>[22]</sup> head of the Second Department of the General Staff in the years 1899-1906, as well as with General Kodama Gentaro (1852-1906)<sup>[23]</sup> – a member of the imperial Main Command Staff. Equipped with recommendations and appropriate contact information, as well as the necessary modest travel funds – Piłsudski and Filipowicz, pseudonym "Karski" (1873-1953)<sup>[24]</sup> on June 9, on the ship RMS "Campania" left London for the United States, from where they would continue on to Tokyo. In connection with their departure for Japan, envoy Hayashi sent a ciphertext to his minister on June 9, 1904, informing him of the decided anti-Russian attitude of both distinguished guests.

Piłsudski and Filipowicz sailed to Yokohama on the night of July 9-10, 1904. On the morning of July 10, they were joined on board by an English-speaking Japanese liaison officer, Major Saburo Inogaki, who took them to Tokyo, where, due to the confidentiality of the mission and the visit to Tokyo, he placed them in the Seiyoken hotel in a park in Ueono, which

<sup>17</sup> Ibidem, p. 37.

<sup>18</sup> Ibidem, p. 38.

<sup>19</sup> Ibidem, p. 38.

<sup>20</sup> W. Pobóg-Malinowski, *The Latest*, op. cit., p. 125.

<sup>21</sup> E. Pałasz-Rutkowska, *AT Romer, History of relations ... op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

<sup>22</sup> Ibidem, p. 40.

<sup>23</sup> Ibidem, p. 40.

<sup>24</sup> Gutenberg Universal Encyclopedia, Contemporary Supplement, Oficyna Wydawnicza DRUCK, Poznań 2002, vol. 5, p. 61.

was not frequented by foreigners. There, while browsing through the magazine *The Japan Times*, from the list of guests of the Metropal hotel, they learned that Dmowski, the then leader of the National League, was also staying in Tokyo.

The meeting of Piłsudski, Filipowicz and Dmowski took place by accident, but intentionally, on 11 July, when in the afternoon they both went by rickshaw to pay Dmowski a visit at the Metropal Hotel. On their way to the hotel they met Dmowski walking with James Douglas near the hotel. Piłsudski, seeing Dmowski and Douglas walking, got out of the rickshaw and approached them, greeted them almost affectionately, "as if with compatriots met abroad", as Filipowicz states in his memoirs,<sup>[25]</sup> and then the four went to a Japanese teahouse for a short chat among compatriots. During the chat Piłsudski arranged a meeting with Dmowski only for 14 July, at 9 a.m. at the Metropal Hotel, because he had already arranged meetings with representatives of the Japanese side for 12 and 13 July. The first of them (July 12) was with General Murato Atsushi – representing the General Staff of the Japanese Army, who spoke on behalf of General Gentaro and General Fukushima Yasumasa, for whom he had letters of recommendation from Colonel Utsunomiya from London, as General Kodama and Fukushima had left for the front in Manchuria in June.

This first official Polish-Japanese meeting was of a courtesy nature, more of an introduction than a substantive one. During it, Piłsudski gave General Murata the letters of recommendation he had, and then, after accepting the letters, Piłsudski informed Piłsudski that Russian prisoners of war declaring Polish nationality were grouped in a prisoner of war camp in Matsuyama and were separated from other prisoners of war from the Russian army, and that the Japanese authorities were doing what they could for them in the existing camp-war situation. At that time – in July 1904 – the number of Russian prisoners of war in the camp in Matsuyama was not very large, as it amounted to only 538 prisoners, including 90 Poles<sup>[26]</sup>. Of course, their number grew with each subsequent battle lost by the Russians against the Japanese. At the same time, General Murata informed his interlocutor that after the war the Japanese government would try to send Russian prisoners of Polish nationality who did not want to return to the territory of the Russian Empire to the United States, so that they would avoid possible accusations of desertion from the Russian army.

Piłsudski, on the other hand, presented to the Japanese interlocutors – because apart from General Murata, the talks were also attended by a representative of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the General Staff Kawakami Toshitsune (1861-1935)<sup>[27]</sup> (later the first Japanese ambassador to reborn Poland, staying there from May 1921 to January 1923) – the general situation of Poland and Russia, emphasizing the need to settle all Polish-Japanese matters as soon as possible.

It was significant that the conversation took place in Russian, which was spoken correctly by the Japanese interlocutors, who were graduates of Russian studies at the Higher School of Foreign Languages in Tokyo. This is very telling, as it shows that the Japanese authorities attached great importance to the knowledge of Russian by their higher-ranking state

officials. At the end of the over-an-hour-long conversation, General Murata asked advisor Kawakami to maintain discretion and not inform Dmowski about the meeting and its content, because Kawakami – on behalf of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs – was Dmowski's interpreter during his stay in Tokyo in June and July 1904. On July 13, J. Piłsudski gave Kawakami the documents he had prepared in the form of a memorandum of Polish- Japanese cooperation, a draft agreement on Polish-Japanese cooperation and a draft propaganda brochure intended for soldiers of the Russian army of Polish nationality.

In his memorial, Piłsudski presented Russia as a conglomeration of various nations, religions and cultures, which, opposed to the tsarist policy of their Russification, under favorable circumstances could organize themselves into a strong opposition that could disintegrate the empire of the Russian tsars from within. At the same time, he tried to show – which is completely understandable – that Poles could play a special role in organizing this multinational anti-tsarist opposition, because as he wrote in his memorial:

1. *"Poles outnumber the other nations mentioned. The number of Poles in Russia is as high as 12 million, but if we add Lithuanians, Belarusians, some Jews and Latvians (...), this number should be increased by almost twice as much,*
2. *It is the Poles among these nations who have the highest political aspirations, who are most involved in the fight against Russia (...),*
3. *It is the Poles who have enormous revolutionary and organizational experience, acquired in a hundred-year struggle against Russia (...),*
4. *The revolutionary movement in Poland already constitutes a serious organized force (...),*
5. *Finally, it is the Poles, being the strongest in numbers and, next to the Finns, the most cultured of all the conquered nations, who constitute their cultural link, all the more so because only the Poles are scattered everywhere in the country in greater or lesser numbers, whether as merchants, engineers and craftsmen, or even as civil servants and army officers (...)"*<sup>[28]</sup>.

At the same time, Piłsudski expressed the opinion that among Poles, only the PPS was currently able to undertake anti-tsarist actions and persuade other oppressed nations of the Russian Empire to do the same – which was not entirely true, because at that time the PPS had neither sufficient human resources for this purpose, nor the appropriate, indispensable material, supply and financial resources.

Piłsudski also presented to the Japanese his assessment of the three main political and social trends existing and operating in the Polish-Lithuanian territories of the Russian partition, emphasizing the activities of the PPS and its alleged scope of influence in the conditions that could be created by the Russo-Japanese war, in which the military successes achieved by the Japanese army disproved the myth of Russia's invincibility and caused an increase in anti-tsarist sentiments among the conquered and oppressed non-Russian nations of the empire of the Russian tsars. In this situation – according to Piłsudski – the formation of an alliance between

<sup>25</sup> Ibidem, p. 47.

<sup>26</sup> Ibidem, p. 46.

<sup>27</sup> Ibidem, p. 48.

<sup>28</sup> Ibidem, p. 48.

Poland and Japan would be a natural thing.

Taking into account the possibility of rejection of some of the Polish postulates concerning military-intelligence-sabotage cooperation by the Japanese side (when Piłsudski went to Tokyo, he knew that the Japanese side was opposed to the establishment of a Polish legion alongside the Japanese army), he wanted to somehow preemptively justify and explain any further rejections of the PPS postulates. On purpose, in the final part of his memorandum, he lamented that: "Japan and Poland know very little about each other, and being separated from each other by a vast area and having no direct economic connection, they have no chance of getting closer and getting to know each other through ordinary relations and interests<sup>[29]</sup>."

At the same time, in the draft agreement on allied cooperation, the PPS side postulated that the Japanese side should, first and foremost:<sup>[30]</sup>

1. granted certain financial subsidies to the PPS – according to the project, it was to be "10,000 pounds payable immediately and a sum of the same amount payable after the new year 1905 and the right to request and receive a much larger sum after that date";
2. provided the PPS with an appropriate amount of weapons and ammunition, because the PPS "needed – immediately – 3,000 firearms and ammunition for them, and 60,000 in the future";
3. expressed consent and provided material and financial assistance for the organization of a Polish legion alongside the Japanese army;
4. the captured soldiers of the Russian army of Polish nationality were treated in a special way and separated from the rest of the Russian prisoners of war taken prisoner by the Japanese;
5. exerted appropriate pressure on the Japanese press to present a positive image and opinion of Poles and Poland under the aggressive Russian occupation;
6. agreed to inform the Polish side (PPS) in advance about the date of concluding peace with Russia, before public opinion in Europe and the world finds out about it.

For its part, the PPS (according to the draft agreement) would have, within the framework of allied cooperation:

1. to provide appropriate people to assist the Japanese side in interrogating prisoners of war from the Russian army and in creating a Polish legion;
2. to deliver second leaflets in the national languages of the non-Russian soldiers of the Russian army, calling on these soldiers to abandon service to the Russian Tsar who were oppressing them and to go over to the Japanese side;
3. undertake sabotage activities to hinder and disorganize the mobilization of reserves in the Polish-Lithuanian territories of the Russian partition;
4. to take action to organize a broader anti-tsarist revolutionary movement in the Russian partition territories and among other non-Russian nations enslaved by the tsar within the empire of the Russian tsars;
5. to organize an anti-tsarist diversionary and sabotage

network on Russia's main communication routes leading from the center of the country to Manchuria;

6. collect and provide the Japanese side with all data relating to the Russian army and its mobilization and supply base, as well as the current political activities of the Russian government in the territories of individual national regions of the Russian Empire.

The draft of the alliance agreement clearly showed that the PPS side was most interested in receiving – first and foremost – some financial subsidies, weapons and ammunition from the Japanese authorities, because the PPS leaders, and especially Piłsudski, believed that an indispensable condition for effective military-intelligence-sabotage cooperation with the Japanese was for the PPS to have its own armed division, with an organizational structure of a military nature and a separate staff directing this structure, with militarized combat groups subordinated to it in the field, which could be used at any time when needed in the field of sabotage-sabotage or other activities. This required not only the right people – who were the easiest to obtain – but above all, appropriate financial resources, and at that time the PPS was in serious short supply, because the party treasury had only "pennies", while the scope of the planned undertakings and tasks required not only thousands, but even millions of different means of payment. Hence, the eyes of the PPS leadership were turned to Japan with the hope that it could begin to increase the PPS party funds, because Japan was at that time the only suitably strong country in the world that was interested in supporting the anti-Russian PPS revolutionary movement, due to the benefits it could bring to Japan through its sabotage and intelligence activities in its favour.

Seeing the need to create a party armed force and hoping to receive Japanese financial and armament support for such an armed force, Piłsudski, at the end of May 1904, before leaving for Japan, ordered Bolesław Berger (1876-1942)<sup>[31]</sup> to begin creating party combat groups "from people who combine intelligence with energy and determination".

Having held the planned meetings with competent representatives of the Japanese General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 12 and 13 July, and having handed them the aforementioned substantive documents concerning allied cooperation and waiting for a response from the Japanese side, Piłsudski held a long conversation with Dmowski on 14 July (in accordance with the agreement). What exactly the leaders of the two (of the three existing at that time) main, but ideologically and tactically opposed Polish political and social groups discussed with each other – none of them revealed in detail either then or later. The fact is that the leadership of the National League – after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in early February 1904 – became the object of interest of the Japanese side earlier than the leadership of the PPS, because already in early March 1904.

The initiator of establishing contacts with the National League was the Japanese military attaché in Stockholm – then colonel and later general Akashi Motojiro (1864-1919),<sup>[32]</sup> who received an order from his

<sup>29</sup> Ibidem, pp. 49-50.

<sup>30</sup> A. Garlicki, Józef Piłsudski ... op. cit., p. 86.

<sup>31</sup> A. Zahorski, A. Sołtan, M. Drozdowski, History of Warsaw, Bellona Publishing House, p. 293.

<sup>32</sup> E. Pałasz-Rutkowska, AT Romer, History of relations ... op. cit., p. 41.

superiors from the General Staff to organize an intelligence network operating in the Russian Empire, which, apart from collecting intelligence data on the Russian army, would also be capable of conducting sabotage and diversion activities on the Trans-Siberian Railway, and would also stimulate the development of the anti-tsarist revolutionary movement – mainly among the communities of nations conquered and oppressed by the tsarist regime, whose armed rebellions in the form of anti-tsarist insurrectionary and guerrilla activities could weaken the Russian army fighting the Japanese in Manchuria. The choice of the National League was not accidental – although in practice it turned out to be not very fortunate.

After the outbreak of war, the Japanese authorities considered the capital of Sweden to be the best place for pro-Japanese organizations that could gather intelligence on Tsarist Russia for the Imperial Japanese authorities. It was here that Colonel Akashi first established contact with representatives of the Finnish political and independence emigration in the person of Konrad Viktor (Konni) Zilliacus (1855-1924), the leader of the Finnish anti-Tsarist opposition, and Janas Castren,<sup>[33]</sup> one of the members of the leadership of the Finnish Constitutional Party. The latter suggested to Akashi that he establish contact with the Polish National League, and hence Akashi met with Dmowski in early March 1904 in Kraków. During this meeting, Akashi is said to have put forward to the National League a proposal to conclude an anti-Tsarist alliance agreement, consisting, among other things, of on the fact that Polish and Finnish anti-tsarist revolutionaries would simultaneously instigate anti-tsarist uprisings in the Polish-Lithuanian lands of the Russian partition and in the area of the Duchy of Finland.

Dmowski, who was opposed to any anti-tsarist armed action on the Polish side, rejected this kind of proposal put forward by Akashi, suggesting, for his part, to limit the actions of the Polish side only to persuading Poles serving in the tsarist army and fighting in Manchuria to go over to the Japanese side – that is, to desert from the tsarist army, without specifying what the Japanese side would do with such "deserters" who, after the end of the war, would not be able to return to the area of the Russian partition, as subjects of the Russian tsars, because they would be threatened with severe penal sanctions for arbitrarily abandoning military service in the Russian army in the face of the enemy and going over to his side.

Dmowski's proposal appealed to Akashi and he suggested to him, as the leader of the National League, a secret trip to Tokyo to discuss ways of implementing his "desertion suggestions" with the appropriate Japanese factors. Dmowski agreed and then Akashi gave him letters of recommendation to Generals Kodama and Fukushima. Dmowski's proposal to go to Tokyo coincided with the establishment of contact with the Japanese by the Galician "Podolacy", acting on behalf of and in cooperation with the conservative-conciliatory-collaborative circles of the lands of the Russian partition, which was supported by Wojciech Dzieduszycki (1848-1909) - the president of the Polish Circle in the Viennese parliament - a representative of the large-scale Galician landed gentry. At the beginning of March 1904, he invited<sup>[34]</sup> the Japanese ambassador in Vienna, Count Makino Nabuaki,

to the seat of his Galician estates in Jezupol for a specially organized congress of the Polish aristocracy and gentry, at which congress the participants of this international meeting, in seemingly random conversations, tried to convince the Japanese ambassador that: "...any anti-Russian uprising in the lands of the Russian partition - should it break out - Russia is able - despite waging war - to bloodily and mercilessly suppress it"<sup>[35]</sup>, and such a Polish uprising will do Japan no good, on the contrary - it can only expose it to the accusation of "supporting the social revolution in Europe", due to which Japan may thus lose a lot in the opinion of the royal courts ruling in Europe.

Due to the fact that Count Nabuaki as an envoy could only convey this kind of opinion of Polish interlocutors to the Japanese authorities in Tokyo, therefore pro-Russian representatives of Polish conservative-conciliatory circles sought ways to reach Japanese decision-making factors. Among others, Seweryn Jung - a wealthy industrialist - proposed to Dmowski to travel to Tokyo on this matter at his expense, probably not knowing - because the matter was confidential - that he had already arranged a trip to Tokyo with Colonel Akashi. Dmowski - under the pretext of going to the United States and Canada - at the end of March 1904, set off on a journey from Krakow to Tokyo, where he stayed at the "Metropol" hotel.

The PPS leadership, when establishing contact with the Japanese, knew nothing about the activities of the landed-industrial conservative-conciliatory circles and Dmowski's National League in this respect. Nor did they pass anything on to their "friends from the PPS" and J. Douglas, whose attitude was ambiguous, because he did not inform them about Dmowski's stay in Tokyo, with whom he met after his arrival in the capital of Japan as a correspondent of the Lvov "Słowo Polskie", although he himself had been warned about the arrival of Piłsudski and Filipowicz vel Karski in Tokyo around 11 July 1904.

After Piłsudski's group began cooperation with the Japanese, in practice it turned out that Piłsudski's proposals were more interesting to the Japanese than Dmowski's. Piłsudski, like Dmowski, did not give the Japanese advice or warnings, at the same time distancing himself from any anti-Russian armed and sabotage-diversionary actions, because the National League did not have the necessary forces or means for this, nor did it have such actions in its ideological and tactical assumptions. It also did not apply for any subsidies from the Japanese government to cover the costs of any anti-Russian allied military-intelligence-diversionary cooperation. The National League did not want anything from the Japanese side except not to engage militarily in Polish affairs, and it did not want to contribute to anything in the field of military-intelligence matters. It only sought to dissuade Japanese decision-makers from possibly inspiring and supporting Polish revolutionary-national circles that wanted to take the opportunity of the Russo-Japanese war to undertake any anti-tsarist armed and sabotage actions with Japanese help. It should be remembered that the then PPS, headed by Piłsudski and his group, was ready to undertake, with the appropriate support of the Japanese authorities, any form of armed and sabotage combat against Russia, hence for the Japanese Piłsudski's PPS was potentially a much more

<sup>33</sup> Ibidem, p. 42.

<sup>34</sup> W. Pobóg-Malinowski, *The Latest*, op. cit., p. 124.

<sup>35</sup> Ibidem, p. 125.

interesting and beneficial ally than Dmowski's National League.

Probably, after familiarizing himself with the proposals and documents presented by Piłsudski after his arrival in Tokyo and after the talks held with him at the General Staff, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Komura Jutaro considered it inappropriate to grant a personal audience to Dmowski, therefore the latter only spoke with Deputy Minister Chindy Suterni (1856-1929), who after the conversation with Dmowski handed him over to the director of the political department of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Yamazy Enjiro, and at this level of the Japanese authorities the talks between Dmowski and the Japanese side ended. On July 22, Dmowski left Japan, having previously met Piłsudski once more, from whom in secret – on July 20 – he submitted his third memorandum to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, presenting in it his fears and reservations concerning the possible commencement of some anti-Russian revolutionary and insurrectionary activities in the Polish-Lithuanian territories of the Russian partition<sup>[36]</sup>.

After Dmowski left Tokyo, on July 23, Piłsudski received a response from the General Staff through the advisor to the General Staff, Kawakami, which:

- strongly rejected the idea of creating a Polish legion alongside the Japanese army;
- stated that the Japanese authorities could not currently undertake any political commitments concerning Polish affairs that could restrict its freedom of political action after the end of the war with Russia, because Japan wanted to have the right of a so-called "free hand" in all its political and military actions after the end of the war;
- confirmed the consent of the Japanese authorities to continue to single out Poles from among the Russian prisoners of war taken by the Japanese army and to treat them on the same principles as before;
- confirmed the interest of the Japanese side in anti-Russian intelligence and diversion-sabotage cooperation with the PPS until the end of the war, hence the Japanese side agreed to: transfer of subsidies to it by Japanese military attachés in London and Paris, which, according to Jędrzejewicz's calculations, amounted to 20,000 pounds by the end of the war<sup>[37]</sup> and financing the purchase of weapons in the amount of 750 revolvers<sup>[38]</sup>.

After receiving the above reply, Piłsudski decided that he would not achieve anything more and decided to return to Poland as soon as possible. On July 30, Piłsudski and Filipowicz left Tokyo and by the end of August they were already in London.

### The effects of Polish-Japanese cooperation

Piłsudski's mission in Tokyo is assessed in various ways. Some say that it "ended in failure"<sup>[39]</sup>, others that it "ended in fiasco"<sup>[40]</sup>, and still others that above all "it did not meet his expectations"<sup>[41]</sup>. In reality, Piłsudski did not achieve much for the PPS. However, the result of the mission should be viewed rather as his tactical success, because when he went to Japan he was aware that he would not be able to obtain everything. Above all, he knew that he would not gain consent to form a Polish legion, which in 1904 was not really needed by either Japan or the PPS. The party could not afford a "Polish legion" either materially, organizationally or mentally. In the draft of the alliance agreement, Piłsudski consciously and deliberately postulated more in order to realistically and effectively obtain less, but he obtained what the PPS needed most - money and short firearms.

Therefore, the consequences of the visit should not be viewed through the prism of rejected postulates, difficult for both sides to implement. The question should be asked – what would Japan and the PPS do with the "Polish Legion" after the end of the Russo-Japanese War? And would the PPS be able to cover the costs of its maintenance, accommodation, and appropriate equipment and weapons in the underground conditions on the lands of the Russian partition, even if Japan gave the PPS this legion with full weapons and military equipment?

The result of Piłsudski's Tokyo mission should be viewed through the prism of obtaining real support that the PPS received from the Japanese, which was a modest but real success

in the conditions existing at that time, because in the absence of sources of broader financing for the PPS:

- obtaining a subsidy of 20,000 British pounds – which, converted at the official bank exchange rate, was equal to 200,000 Russian rubles – already allowed J. Piłsudski's group to gain some financial independence;
- The financing by the Japanese of the purchase of 750 pieces of short firearms for the PPS: "Mauser" pistols with folding stocks and "Savage" revolvers allowed the armed groups of the PPS organized in Warsaw and other Polish cities under Russian rule to be armed with firearms, which operated in the form of Combat Circles of the Workers' Self-Defense (KB SR).

In early autumn 1904, the BSR circles in Warsaw already numbered 80 armed PPS fighters, organized in 8 combat circles of 10 people each<sup>[42]</sup>. From October, such circles began to be established in: Białystok, Grodno, Brest, Łódź, the Dąbrowa Basin, Częstochowa and Zawiercie<sup>[43]</sup>. After Piłsudski returned from Tokyo to Poland, in September, at

<sup>36</sup> E. Pałasz-Rutkowska, AT Romer, History of relations ... op. cit., p. 51.

<sup>37</sup> A. Garlicki, Józef Piłsudski ... op. cit., p. 87.

<sup>38</sup> E. Pałasz-Rutkowska, AT Romer, History of relations ... op. cit., p. 56.

<sup>39</sup> Ibidem, p. 54.

<sup>40</sup> A. Garlicki, Józef Piłsudski ... op. cit., p. 87.

<sup>41</sup> A. Kosecki, A. Stawarz (eds.), Warsaw and Mazovia in the fight for the country's independence in the years 1794-1920, Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, Warsaw 2001, p. 213.

<sup>42</sup> Ibidem, p. 213.

<sup>43</sup> Ibidem, p. 213.

the 5th Conference of the Executive Commission of the CKR PPS, which took place in Kraków on 17-20 October, Piłsudski proposed to the gathered PPS decision-makers that *the PPS "move to new tactics"* (fighting against tsarism) - the so-called *"tactics of action"* <sup>[44]</sup>. After accepting Piłsudski's proposal, the gathered passed a resolution to establish new KB SR "wherever the conditions are right". In the initial period, their tasks were to:

1. organizing anti-tsarist anti-war demonstrations and protecting them against police and military attempts to disperse and pacify them;
2. distributing anti-tsarist and anti-war prints and propaganda magazines of the PPS;
3. breaking up pro-government demonstrations of support for the occupying authorities, organised by conciliatory and collaborationist circles.

For the first time, the 10-person KB SR, commanded by a 30-year-old PPS activist from Wola and Powązki – Waclaw Brokowski, pseudonym "Burza", appeared as a protective force for a workers' demonstration against the Cossacks and mounted Russian police in Warsaw at Grzybowski Square, on June 13, 1904, armed only with sticks, clubs and wooden batons. The fighters did not yet have short firearms. The KB SR was equipped with this means of combat against the police and military units of the tsarist occupying authorities only at the end of October, because earlier "Mauser" pistols and "Savage" revolvers – S. Wojciechowski had to buy them in Hamburg for money received from the Japanese military attaché in London, and then W. Jodko-Narkiewicz had to smuggle them across the Prussian-Austrian border to the territory of the Russian partition.

In the meantime, the tactics of the fight against tsarism of all Polish workers' and socialist parties became radicalized. Anti-war demonstrations became more frequent and numerous. The Warsaw organization SDKPiL organized an anti-war demonstration on October 23rd behind the Wola tollgate, but it was dispersed by a charge of Cossacks. On October 28th, the Warsaw Workers' Committee of the PPS organized an anti-war demonstration in Leszno Warszawskie against the mobilization of Polish recruits and so-called spares to the Russian army, 80 demonstrators were wounded in a clash with Cossacks and mounted police <sup>[45]</sup>. These casualties caused outrage among the workers and craftsmen of Warsaw, while the conciliatory and collaborationist circles were frightened by the activation and radicalization of the Warsaw workers' and socialist circles.

Therefore, on November 10, 23 well-known conciliatory and collaborationist activists who were under the leadership influence of, among others, Margrave Zygmunt Wielopolski and Prince Michał Radziwiłł sent a special memorandum to Tsar Nicholas II regarding:

1. abolition of political restrictions in the Polish lands of the Russian partition;
2. introduction of local government in Polish lands;
3. announcement of religious tolerance in Polish lands;
4. restoring the Polish language of instruction in Polish schools, and the Polish stage language in culture.

At the same time, the National League and the National Democratic Party, proclaiming independence slogans, supported their realization within the framework of the constitutional autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland as a part of the Russian Empire. On the other hand, another demonstration organized by the SDKPiL on October 30, on the streets of Wronia, Krochmalna and Ogrodowa, was held under the slogans: "Down with mobilization!", "Bread and work", "Long live socialism!" The Warsaw organization of the Jewish "Bund" also actively participated in the anti-tsarist demonstrations of the workers' communities of Warsaw, whose members (on November 5) clashed with the tsarist police on Marszałkowska Street.

At the same time, the anti-tsarist demonstration, organized by members of the Warsaw Workers' Committee of the PPS: Józef Kwiatek (1874-1910) and Walery Sławek (1879-1939), on Sunday, November 13, at Grzybowski Square, had a very wide political echo and many thousands of Warsaw communities participated in the history of workers' and socialist manifestations in the capital. This anti-tsarist demonstration was organized by members of the Warsaw Workers' Committee of the PPS: Józef Kwiatek (1874-1910) and Walery Sławek (1879-1939), on Sunday, November 13, <sup>[46]</sup> at Grzybowski Square. This anti-tsarist manifestation was announced some time in advance with three appeals: "To the workers", "To the youth" and "To the general population".

The occupying police and military authorities, thus forewarned, and additionally in possession of information concerning this demonstration from one of their agents in the ranks of the Warsaw PPS organization, stationed Cossacks and policemen in the courtyards and gates of the properties surrounding Grzybowski Square, who tried to disperse the incoming people, but to no avail.

November 13, 1904 was Sunday, at 1 p.m., after mass, people began to leave the "All Saints" church, then a red banner appeared in front of them, which Stefan Okrzeja's sister unfurled and handed to him. The banner bore the inscriptions: "*PPS. Down with war and tsarism!*" "*Long live the free Polish people!*" Someone intoned "Warszawianka", which was caught by the gathered crowd of people, who moved towards Bagno Street. At the head of the singing procession, with an unfurled banner, walked Stefan Okrzeja (1886-1905) surrounded by a group of fighters of the Workers' Self-Defense, armed with short firearms.

Then, from the gates of nearby properties, the tsarist policemen, who had been hidden there until then, ran out, and, flailing at the marching demonstrators with their sabres, tried to break through to the banner and snatch it from Okrzeja's hands. When one of them was almost reaching for it, Stefan Okrzeja shot at him, wounding the hand reaching for the banner. A fierce but chaotic shooting began, which was started by the Workers' Self-Defense fighters protecting the demonstration. There were about 60 of them in total <sup>[47]</sup>. The opening of fire by the demonstration security caused the tsarist policemen to retreat and flee, taking refuge in the gates of nearby properties. The crowd of demonstrators, seeing the tsarist policemen fleeing, moved forward more briskly, and above them appeared new red banners with the inscriptions:

<sup>44</sup>Ibidem, p. 213.

<sup>45</sup>Ibidem, p. 293.

<sup>46</sup>Ibidem, p. 294.

<sup>47</sup>W. Pobóg-Malinowski, *The Latest*, op. cit., p. 137.

" *Down with mobilization* ", " *Down with tsarism* ", " *Long live the PPS* ", " *Long live independent Poland* ". After a moment, a detachment of Tsarist Cossacks on horseback charged the demonstrators. The first ranks of defenseless people could not withstand the momentum of the Cossack charge, breaking up into small groups of people, fleeing from the charging Cossacks.

A group of about 20 Self-Defense fighters, protecting Stefan Okrzeja and the banner, shot their way to the corner of Marszałkowska and Świętokrzyska streets, <sup>[48]</sup> where the banner was rolled up and the group dispersed. However, shooting continued at Grzybowski Square and nearby, as a result of which the Cossacks and the police quickly gained the upper hand. 413 demonstrators were arrested, <sup>[49]</sup> and many sought shelter in the "All Saints" Church, where they stayed for many hours, fearing arrest. The police did not enter the church, and the demonstrators left it only when the Warsaw Police Superintendent, Colonel Karl Nolken, gave them a deceitful "word of honor" that they would not be in danger. When they left, Nolken, breaking his word, arrested another 250 people. The anti-tsarist street riots in Warsaw on November 13, 1904 lasted - in various parts of it - until dusk. As a result, 6 demonstrators died, 27 suffered serious injuries that required hospital treatment, and as many as 663 people were placed in the custody of the tsarist police. <sup>[50]</sup>

The anti-tsarist demonstration of November 13 gained much publicity both in the Polish lands of all three partitions and among anti-tsarist Russian revolutionaries, as well as in the countries of Western Europe. It also reached the authorities of Manchuria, which was fighting with Tsarist Russia on the battlefields, and imperial Japan. It was a signal announcing to Europe and the world that the Polish nation was again taking up arms against the Tsarist occupation and captivity - after 40 years of post-uprising trauma that had overwhelmed it after the suppression of the January Uprising of 1863-1864 by the Tsarist regime.

At the same time, this publicity contributed to a significant increase in the ranks of all the workers' and socialist parties of the Polish-Lithuanian territories under partition and significantly raised the authority of the PPS in the eyes of the average resident, while at the same time arousing fear and anxiety in the conciliatory and collaborationist circles of these territories. It also became an impulse for similar actions by workers' and socialist circles in other locations of the Polish-Lithuanian territories under Russian partition, because it showed the possibility of overcoming the fear of a clash with the tsarist military and police units. It was also sufficient motivation for the further development of the armed structure of the PPS and the reason for its disintegration into two different directions of action of its members - national-independence and internationalist-workers.

The armed demonstration of the PPS on November 13, 1904 at Grzybowski Square in Warsaw became the inspiration for carrying out such armed demonstrations from November 17 to December 26, in Radom, Ostrowiec, Ćmielów, Kalisz, Sosnowiec, Łódź, Pabianice, Starachowice and Zawiercie. <sup>[51]</sup> These demonstrations took place under red banners with slogans such as " *Down with mobilization!* ", " *We do not want to be soldiers of the tsar!* " and " *Long live free Poland!* ", gathering large crowds of demonstrators. The latter also paid a tribute of Polish blood on this battlefield, especially when on January 28, 1905 – as a sign of protest against the bloody suppression by the tsarist troops of the peaceful demonstration of the residents of St. Petersburg on Sunday, January 22, which went down in history as "Bloody Sunday" <sup>[52]</sup> – the Warsaw Workers' Committee of the PPS called on the residents of Warsaw and other regions of the Polish lands under Russian rule to a general strike. As part of this, the first to stand down were the Warsaw workplaces, shops were closed and traffic on the streets of the city was suspended, and the number of strikers reached 110,000 <sup>[53]</sup>.

Following the example of Warsaw, the strike very quickly spread to the entire area of Polish lands under Russian rule. In many places, there were bloody clashes between demonstrators and the tsarist, pacifying police and military units. There were dead and wounded. For example, in the clashes with these units there were: <sup>[54]</sup>

1. in Łódź – 11 dead and 108 injured protesters,
2. in Radom – 28 killed and an unknown number of injured,
3. in Skarżysko – 5 dead and an unknown number of injured,
4. in Ostrowiec – 29 killed and 40 injured.

Before the PPS called for a general strike to disrupt the mobilisation of the reserves of the Tsarist army and at the same time demonstrate to the "allied Japanese authorities" that "the PPS leaders know how to not only write about sabotage and diversion activities, but also carry them out in reality" - PPS militias damaged railway bridges on the Radom - Łódź - Zduńska Wola - Sieradz line. <sup>[55]</sup> Of course, these actions did not stop the mobilisation, because the PPS was too weak for this, and only slightly disrupted it. Nevertheless, these actions, together with the general strike, were an expression of both a high increase in social and national discontent, conducive to the establishment of "elements of national power organised in the form of a penal and efficiently operating paramilitary organisation".

In the conditions of such social and national demand, the 7th Congress of the PPS, which took place in Warsaw on 5-7 March 1905, established – based on the already existing Combat Circles of the Workers' Self-Defence – the PPS Conspiracy-Combat Organization (OS-B PPS) and its

<sup>48</sup> A. Garlicki, Józef Piłsudski ... op. cit., p. 91.

<sup>49</sup> Ibidem, p. 91.

<sup>50</sup> Ibidem, p. 92.

<sup>51</sup> W. Pobóg-Malinowski, The Latest... , op. cit., p. 138.

<sup>52</sup> The Great Universal Encyclopedia, PWN Publishing House 1962-1970., vol. 6, p. 215.

<sup>53</sup> W. Pobóg-Malinowski, The Latest ... , op. cit., p. 82, p. 138.

<sup>54</sup> Ibidem, p. 138.

<sup>55</sup> Ibidem, p. 138.

command and staff body in the form of the Conspiracy-Combat Department of the CKR PPS (WS-B CKR PPS),<sup>[56]</sup> which subordinated all the local and territorial Combat Circles of the Workers' Self-Defence to itself in terms of organization and managed them through the Department's instructors.

The rank-and-file fighters of the local OS-B PPS units were recruited from among young workers and intelligentsia youth who had received their basic combat and military training in the territory of Polish Galicia under the Austrian partition.

Initially, the following persons were placed at the head of WS-B CKR:

1. Aleksander Błażej Prystor (1874-1941),<sup>[57]</sup> who was responsible for creating the ranks of OS-B PPS fighters on the basis of "Berger's fighters",
2. Walery Sławek, pseudonym "Gustaw" (1879-1939),<sup>[58]</sup> responsible for the creation and training of instructor staff for the emerging OS-B PPS combat units.

A heated discussion also broke out within the PPS on the purpose and use as well as the structural subordination of OS-B in the PPS organizational system. In the conditions of the growing revolutionary turmoil of 1905 in the Polish territories of the Russian partition, which occurred as a result of the general strike, at the June PPS Party Council (15-17 June 1905, Mińsk Mazowiecki), Piłsudski presented the concept of "unit tactics", consisting in creating - in place of the previous Self-Defense Combat Circles - properly trained and appropriately armed PPS conspiratorial units, which would be capable of conducting various types of anti-tsarist actions and armed clashes with the police and the army, because, as Piłsudski put it: "*You can't kill a soldier with Marx*".<sup>[59]</sup>

The June Council of the PPS supported Piłsudski's concept of "unit tactics", but initially rejected the concept of creating local-territorial Combat Circles independent of the local - regional PPS workers' committees and remaining only subordinate to the WS-B CKR - which threatened the creation of a kind of "party within the party". Therefore, it initially subordinated the newly formed PPS combat units to the PPS District Committees. At the same time, the Council approved the following tasks for the WS-B CKR:<sup>[60]</sup>

1. conducting preparatory and technical works for all PPS combat actions,
2. conducting combat training of agitation groups and special combat groups organized in agreement with the general party organization of the PPS, which meant regional workers' committees,
3. developing technical methods of revolutionary struggle, which meant mastering combat techniques by members of Combat Circles and using them in the fight against tsarism,
4. carrying out unit terrorist acts, which meant undertaking larger anti-tsarist actions by larger armed groups, such as terrorist-sabotage actions by ad hoc organized partisan subunits.

These tasks clearly indicate their inspiration by Piłsudski, who in October 1905 was appointed by the CKR PPS to the function of the head of WS-B CKR. At the same time, a double organizational and structural solution was adopted, consisting in the decision to secretly establish the Department and the newly established OS-B subunits against other organizational units of the PPS, recommending their clandestine creation and military training, as well as equipping them with weapons and ammunition. On the other hand, the previous combat groups were to remain at the disposal of the regional workers' committees of the PPS, as the so-called "local technical and combat organizations", being a kind of "field protective guard of the PPS".

### Summary

Polish-Japanese intelligence cooperation at the beginning of the 20th century was of great importance not only for the further political relations of both countries. First of all, it should be noted that following the Tokyo visit, Piłsudski, having obtained not very large, but significant in the conditions of the Russian occupation, Japanese subsidies, created subordinated PPE armed units, which were the beginning and precursor of the Polish Legions of World War I in 1914-1918,<sup>[61]</sup> which won independence for the Second Polish Republic, initially fighting against the tsarist regime alongside the tsarist-royal army of the Austrian-Hungarian Habsburgs of Vienna.

Another consequence of the modest but important military-intelligence cooperation between the PPS and the Japanese authorities was the Polish-Japanese cooperation, not yet anticipated in 1904, but already initiated during the interwar period of 1919-1939 and the period of World War II<sup>[62]</sup>.

Finally, a currently invisible but no less significant consequence of this cooperation was the fact that Poland and Japan did not formally declare war on each other during World War II and did not actually conduct any military operations against each other. This state of affairs was influenced not only by the considerable distance separating the two countries, but above all by the memory of good pre-war political and military relations.

The Poles and Japanese are mostly brave, courageous people with such traits as a sense of dignity, honor and undoubtedly caring for the common good. These traits, common to the citizens of both countries, may have brought the two nations closer together and enabled intelligence and military cooperation aimed at defeating the common enemy.

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<sup>56</sup> A. Garlicki, Józef Piłsudski ... op. cit., p. 96.

<sup>57</sup> The Great Encyclopedia of Poland, Publishing House "FOGRA", Kraków 1999, vol. 3, p. 118.

<sup>58</sup> The Great Encyclopedia of Poland, Publishing House "FOGRA", Kraków 1999, vol. 3, p. 228.

<sup>59</sup> A. Garlicki, Józef Piłsudski ... op. cit., p. 99.

<sup>60</sup> Ibidem, p. 101.

<sup>61</sup> BELLONA Military Encyclopedia, PWN, Warsaw 2007, vol. 1, p. 512.

<sup>62</sup> For more information, see: H. Kuromiya, A. Peplowski Between Warsaw and Tokyo. Polish-Japanese Intelligence Cooperation 1904-1944, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2009.

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